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Authentication

Mooney v. State

321 A.3d 91 · Supreme Court of Maryland · 2024-08-13 · No. No. 32, September Term, 2023

Mooney's appeal from his criminal conviction in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on review in the Supreme Court of Maryland after the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the admission of a surveillance video

Issue
Can a video be authenticated in Maryland through circumstantial evidence under Rule 5-901(b)(4) when the only testifying witness has personal knowledge of some but not all of the events shown, and does the arrival of image-generating artificial intelligence require a stricter foundation than existing methods provide?
Rule
Maryland Rule 5-901(a) satisfies the authentication requirement with evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Rule 5-901(b) lists nonexclusive methods, including testimony of a witness with knowledge under Rule 5-901(b)(1) and circumstantial evidence such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location or other distinctive characteristics under Rule 5-901(b)(4). The Supreme Court of Maryland applied the reasonable juror test from State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560, 597 (2020): the trial court may admit the video if the evidence would let a reasonable juror find by a preponderance that the video is what it is claimed to be. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Cole, 342 Md. 12 (1996), had described the pictorial testimony and silent witness theories, and the Court held those are not the exclusive routes to authenticating a video.
Application
The video in Mooney was roughly one minute and fifty-one seconds long and came from a camera mounted on the exterior wall of a residence near a shooting scene on the 3900 block of Falls Road in Baltimore. Detective Liu testified that officers arriving at a scene first look for witnesses and cameras, and that he obtained this footage the night of the shooting from a local resident whose identity does not appear in the record. Mr. Zimmerman, the shooting victim, testified before the video was admitted that it showed him sitting in his vehicle on a block he recognized, that it was a true and accurate depiction of the events of that night, and that it did not appear to have been edited or altered. He had firsthand knowledge of Mooney walking toward and past his car, of Mooney slowing down, of opening his door to look for him, and of being shot as soon as he sat back in the driver's seat. He did not see the shooting itself and could not say who fired. The Supreme Court of Maryland split the video into the parts Zimmerman had witnessed and the seconds he had not. The former were authenticated under Rule 5-901(b)(1) by his testimony as a witness with knowledge. The latter were authenticated circumstantially under Rule 5-901(b)(4), and the Court identified three circumstances that carried that weight: the extremely close temporal proximity between the shooting and the events Zimmerman could verify, which it analogized to the role temporal proximity played in authenticating social media evidence in Sample and in Sublet v. State; his testimony that the recording matched his observations and showed no sign of editing; and the nature and origin of the footage, recovered the same night from a neighbor's camera unconnected to the police, the victim or the defendant. The Court added a practical warning that cuts against reading the case too broadly: authenticating video through circumstantial evidence will generally require more fulsome and more specifically tailored questioning than the routine fair-and-accurate-depiction question that establishes a Rule 5-901(b)(1) foundation, and the prosecutor here asked few such questions. It was the particular strength of the temporal proximity and the origin evidence that made the thin questioning survivable. On fabrication, the majority acknowledged in its conclusion that video is susceptible to alteration and that image-generating artificial intelligence may present unique challenges, but it held that existing authentication methods, vigilantly applied, remain adequate at this time, and it repeated Sample's rule that a proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity or prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be. The Court also observed that although the burden was the State's, Mooney's counsel had argued only that there was no way to know whether the video had been altered and never alleged that it was. Chief Judge Fader concurred to say the evidentiary concerns raised by generative artificial intelligence are real and pressing and may eventually require Maryland to adjust its rules, but that nothing in this record hinted at any AI involvement. Judge Gould dissented, opening on the age of artificial intelligence and the risk of fabricated or altered evidence, and arguing that Rule 5-901 had not been vigilantly applied: in his view the few seconds showing the shooting were authenticated by none of the three methods, and the trial court should have required the State to edit them out. Gould was explicit that he had no reason to believe this video was altered and that his hypotheticals were meant only to expose weaknesses in the majority's reasoning.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video, with costs to Mooney. Judge Watts wrote for the Court. Chief Judge Fader concurred, joining the majority in full. Judge Gould dissented and would have reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the portion of the video depicting the shooting should not have been admitted.

Video footage, like social media evidence, is susceptible to alteration, and the increased availability of new technology, particularly the advent of image-generating artificial intelligence, may present unique challenges in authenticating videos and photographs.

Majority, Watts, J., opening the conclusion of the opinion

at this time, video footage can be authenticated through vigilant application of existing methods for authentication of evidence

Majority, Watts, J., the sentence Judge Gould's dissent quotes back

But the record in this case does not contain any hint that artificial intelligence may have played a role, nor was there any suggestion that the video may have been altered in any way.

Fader, C.J., concurring

In the age of artificial intelligence, the risk of fabricated or altered evidence has never been greater, and that risk will only increase as technology advances.

Gould, J., dissenting, opening line

Why it matters. Mooney is the decision courts now reach for when a party invokes deepfakes without record support, because it holds that the proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity. It was cited for exactly that proposition by the Iowa Court of Appeals in State v. Amyda and by Judge Singas dissenting in Matter of M.S., which makes it the fixed point that the New York majority's approach departs from.

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This summary was written from the opinion itself. Every quotation above was located in the text of the decision it is attributed to. It is a summary for public education and is not legal advice.